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I. INTRODUCTION

During her long tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
played a pivotal role in shaping the Court's approach to the issues raised by
affirmative action programs. Indeed, beginning with the 1989 decision in City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,1 Justice O'Connor's position essentially
determined the position that would be adopted by the Court as an institution. In
Croson, Justice O'Connor seemed to indicate that she would generally be very
hostile to race-based affirmative action programs. 2 However, in 2003, in the
University of Michigan affirmative action cases-Grutterv. Bollinger3 and Gratz
v. Bollinger 4-she showed a much greater willingness to countenance such
programs. 5
This Article will trace the evolution of Justice O'Connor's analysis of racebased affirmative action and critique her reasoning in Grutter and Gratz. The
Article will begin by describing the approach outlined by Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,6 which established the
benchmark against which subsequent affirmative action decisions have been
measured.7 The Article will then describe the arguments made by Justice
Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden).
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).

2. Id. at 493-94.
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
5. See infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
6. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7. Grutter,539 U.S. at 323 ("Since this Court's splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell's
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis
of race-conscious admissions policies.").
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O'Connor in the affirmative action cases that came before her, and conclude that
the positions she ultimately took in the University of Michigan affirmative action
cases were unsound in theory and created undesirable practical consequences.
II. PRELUDE: THE BAKKE DECISION

The battle lines over affirmative action in education had been drawn well
before Justice O'Connor came to the Court in 1981. At the time of her
appointment, Justice Powell's 1978 opinion in Bakke was the starting point for
most discussions of the issue. 8 Bakke was a challenge to the admissions policy of
the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, which reserved
sixteen of the one hundred spaces in each entering class for members of
underrepresented minority groups (URMs). 9 Four Justices would have applied an
intermediate level of scrutiny and concluded that the Davis Medical School plan
was constitutionally unobjectionable.10 At the same time, four other Justices
would have eschewed discussion of the constitutional issue altogether, instead
declaring that the plan violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11
This division left Justice Powell with the balance of power. 12 After concluding
that the statutory requirements of Title VI were coextensive with the commands
of the Equal Protection Clause,13 Justice Powell began his analysis of the
constitutional issue by arguing that any classification based on race was subject to
strict scrutiny.1 4 Thus, he asserted that the Davis Medical School plan could only
pass constitutional muster if it served a state "purpose or interest [that was] both
constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that [the] use of the classification
...to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of
[was] 'necessary
15
its interest."
Against this background, Justice Powell considered a number of different
interests that might have been served by the affirmative action program. He
rejected the desire to achieve racial balance in the medical school class per se as
insufficient on its face, and did not approve an interest in redressing past societal
discrimination.' 6 While conceding that improving the delivery of health care
services to underserved populations might in some circumstances be sufficient to
support a racial classification, Justice Powell observed that the record did not
8. Id.
9. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-70, 275.
10. Id. at 324, 358-59, 362, 379 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (explaining the application of intermediate scrutiny and

concluding that the admission program should be upheld).
at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
11. Id.
12. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 322-23 (noting that Justice Powell's opinion was the only holding
for the Court in Bakke because of the split among the other Justices).
13. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 283-87.
14. Id. at 290-91, 305.
15. Id.
at 305 (quoting Inre Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)).
16. Id.
at 307-10.
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contain any evidence
that suggested the Davis Medical School's plan actually
17
interest.
that
served
By contrast, Justice Powell did view the Davis Medical School's plan as one
that promoted the school's interest in maintaining a diverse student body. 8 In
characterizing this interest as compelling for constitutional purposes, he observed
that "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so essential to
the quality of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse
student body."' 9 In addition, he asserted that "it is not too much to say that the
'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas
and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples. 2 °
At the same time, Justice Powell rejected the university's claim that the
reservation of a specific number of places for URMs was either necessary or even
the most effective means of serving the interest in diversity. 21 Instead, he asserted
that the university could achieve its objective by considering race as simply one
factor in a process that gave individualized consideration to the diversity claims
asserted by each applicant, thereby allowing persons of all races to compete for
all seats in the entering class.22 He specifically singled out the policy adopted to
govern admission to Harvard College, which explicitly analogized the importance
of admitting URMs to that of admitting students from Idaho. 23 Thus, although
concluding that race could be given some consideration in the admissions process,
Justice Powell also found that the Davis plan did not pass constitutional muster.
Because the other Justices were evenly split, these conclusions became the
judgment of the Court as a whole.
In the wake of the Bakke decision, colleges and universities rushed to conform
their affirmative action programs to the standards enunciated by Justice Powell.24
Formally, at least, the idea of considering the applications of URMs in a separate
process became anathema, and individualized consideration became the
watchword.25 Admissions officers who had hitherto spoken almost exclusively in
the language of redressing past discrimination suddenly discovered that the real
reason to increase the number of URMs who were admitted was to achieve the

17. Id. at 310-11.
18. Id. at 315.
19. Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result)).
20. Id. at 313 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
21. id. at 315-16.
22. Id. at317.
23. Id. at 316.
24. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (observing that many universities
modeled their admissions programs on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke).
25. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 577 (2000) ("[B]ecause of
Justice Powell's emphasis on the almost unique legitimacy of'diversity' as a constitutional value, it
has become the catchword-indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say 'mantra'-of those
defending the use of racial or ethnic preferences.").
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educational benefits of diversity. 26 These developments formed the backdrop for
Justice O'Connor's entrance into the fray.
III. JUSTICE O'CONNOR AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FROM WYGANT THROUGH
ADARAND

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education27 was Justice O'Connor's first
encounter with the constitutional problems raised by race-based affirmative
action. 28 There the Court was faced with a union contract, which provided
generally that layoffs of teachers should be made in reverse order of seniority, but
at the same time prohibited the local school board from reducing the percentage
of minority teachers in the workforce. 29 The latter provision was challenged by
nonminority teachers who were laid off despite having greater seniority than
African American teachers who were retained.3 °
Justice O'Connor was one of five Justices who concluded that the affirmative
action provision was unconstitutional. She joined the portions of Justice Powell's
plurality opinion that both reaffirmed the applicability of strict scrutiny to all
race-based classifications 3' and asserted that neither past societal discrimination
nor the need to provide role models was a constitutionally sufficient justification
for affirmative action programs. 32 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
also emphasized that the "layoff provision [wa]s not 'narrowly tailored' to
achieve its asserted remedial purpose" because the provision acted to maintain
levels of minority hiring set by a hiring goal that had 33no demonstrable
relationship to the remedying of employment discrimination.
However, Justice O'Connor also seemed to indicate that she would
countenance some affirmative action plans. She implicitly embraced Justice
Powell's view that advancing racial diversity was a compelling governmental
interest for educational institutions 34 and further suggested that the Court might
well view other interests as "sufficiently 'important' or 'compelling' to sustain the
use of affirmative action policies. 35 Moreover, Justice O'Connor explicitly
rejected the contention that remedial racial classifications must be based on a
formal determination that the government actor had engaged in intentional
discrimination, concluding instead that the implementation of a race-conscious

26. See id.
27. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
28. Jennifer R. Byrne, Comment, Toward a Colorblind Constitution: Justice O'Connor's
Narrowing ofAffirmative Action, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 619, 629 (1998).
29. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269-70 (plurality opinion).
30. Id.at 272.
31. Id. at 285-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 288.
33. Id. at 293-94.
34. Id. at 286.
35. Id.
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plan required only "a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required. 3 6
In short, as Justice Powell had done in Bakke, Justice O'Connor in Wygant
embraced a theory of strict scrutiny that was significantly less than fatal in fact.
In 1988, Justice O'Connor moved to center stage in the struggle over
affirmative action in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 37 Croson was a
challenge to a Richmond city ordinance that required prime contractors on city
projects to subcontract at least thirty percent of the work to enterprises controlled
by underrepresented minorities. 38 Justice O'Connor spoke for the five Justices
who concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional.39
The tone of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson was somewhat different
from that of her concurrence in Wygant. After reiterating the view that race-based
affirmative action plans were to be subjected to strict scrutiny,4 ° she turned to an
analysis of the specific state interests asserted in defense of the ordinance. 4' She
conceded that "if the city could show that it had essentially become a 'passive
participant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local
construction industry, we think it clear that the city could take affirmative steps to
dismantle such a system." 42 But at the same time, observing that "the mere
recitation of a 'benign' or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled
to little or no weight, 4 3 she stated that "a generalized assertion that there has
been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a
' 4
legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy, A
and that "[w]hile there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public
discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black
entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone, cannotjustify a rigid racial quota
in the awarding of public contracts in Richmond. 4 5 Because operating as a
contractor in the skilled trades required more than "minimal training," Justice
O'Connor also rejected the notion that an inference of a pattern of intentional
discrimination could be drawn from the underrepresentation of the minority
46
population at-large, absent data for "minority participation in subcontracting."

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Id. at 477.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 493-98.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 501-03.
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Thus, she concluded:
[T]he city has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in
apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race. To
accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can
serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door
to competing claims for "remedial relief' for every disadvantaged
group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race
is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a
mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims
of past wrongs.4 7

Although not categorically barring the use of race-based affirmative action
programs by the government, on its face Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson
seemed to suggest that such programs would almost never pass constitutional
muster. Indeed, despite his expressed preference for a rule that would have
invalidated all race-based classifications that were not necessary remedies for
victims of past racial discrimination, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy was content to
join the opinion, in large measure because, in his view, the strict scrutiny standard
enunciated in the opinion "will operate in a manner generally consistent with the
imperative of race neutrality, because it forbids the use even of narrowly drawn
racial classifications except as a last resort. 48 Soon, however, Justice O'Connor
herself would revert to the less jaundiced view of affirmative action programs that
she had expressed in Wygant.
Six years later, Justice O'Connor's renewed tolerance for affirmative action
programs was evident in her opinion in AdarandConstructors,Inc. v. Pena.49 In
Adarand, she spoke for the Court in overruling the 1990 decision in Metro
Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC,50 concluding that strict scrutiny applied to race-based
affirmative action programs adopted by the federal government, as well as state
and local authorities. 5 1 Nevertheless, she took pains to once again reject the
notion that the level of scrutiny she endorsed was "strict in theory, but fatal in
fact," 52 observing that "[t]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and the
lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is
an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response
to it."' 53 Further, she asserted that "[w]hen race-based action is necessary to
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it
satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases. 54
47. Id. at 505-06.
48. Id. at 518-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
49. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
50. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
51. Adarand,515 U.S. at 227.
52. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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These observations foreshadowed Justice O'Connor's treatment of the University
of Michigan affirmative action cases.
IV.

GRATZAND GRUTTER

In Gratz and Grutter, the Court considered the constitutionality of the use of
race in the admissions process at the University of Michigan. 55 While Gratz was
56
a challenge to the affirmative action program in undergraduate admissions,
Grutter focused on admissions to the Law School. 57 On their faces at least, the
two processes were quite different in operation. The undergraduate admissions
process was based on a pure numerical calculation, in which being a member of a
URM was worth 20 of the 100 points that guaranteed admission on a 150-point
scale.58 By contrast, the Law School purported to consider race only as one factor
in a holistic process, "the hallmark of [which] is its focus on academic ability
coupled with a flexible assessment of applicants' talents, experiences, and
potential 'to contribute to the learning of those around them."' 59 Against this
background, the Court found the affirmative action program in Gratz
unconstitutional, 60 but rejected the constitutional attack on the program in
Grutter.61 In each case, the Justices divided five to four, with Justice O'Connor
62
being the only Justice who joined the majority in both cases.
In her opinion for the Court in Grutter,Justice O'Connor observed that Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke had "served as the touchstone for the constitutional
analysis of race-conscious admissions policies," and had been relied upon by
colleges and universities in designing such programs. 63 Noting that the Law
School relied on the need for a diverse student body to justify its consideration of
race, Justice O'Connor concluded that the Court should defer to the Law School's
assertion that racial "diversity is essential to its educational mission."64 She
distinguished the effort to enroll a "critical mass" of URMs from "outright racial
balancing," asserting that the former was defined by reference to the educational
65
benefits that diversity is designed to produce.
Justice O'Connor's opinion identified a number of these putative benefits.
Drawing heavily on the briefs filed in support of the law school plan, she asserted
55.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249-50

(2003).
56. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249-50.
57. Grutter,539 U.S. at 311.
58.

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.

59.

Grutter,539 U.S. at 315.

60. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76.
61. Grutter,539 U.S. at 334-35.
62. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311, 344, 346, 349, 378, 387; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249, 276, 282,
291,298.
63. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323.
64. Id. at 328.
65. Id. at 329-30.
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that "'classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting' when the students have 'the greatest possible variety
of backgrounds'; 66 that an education at a law school with a substantial
representation of URMs "'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals"'; 67 that the
military in particular relied on selective educational institutions to produce
candidates for an officer corps that is 'both highly qualified and racially
diverse"'; 68 that "[e]ffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation,
indivisible, is to be realized"; 69 that such participation requires training at
institutions that are themselves racially diverse; and that "[iln order to cultivate a
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the
path to leadership [such as that provided by law schools] be70visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."
Having concluded that the use of race in the law school plan served a
compelling governmental interest, Justice O'Connor then turned to the question
of whether the plan was "' specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that
purpose."' 7 1 She concluded that this requirement was satisfied as well.72
Analogizing the operation of the plan to the Harvard system that Justice Powell
had praised so lavishly in Bakke, Justice O'Connor focused on a number of
different factors in making this determination.73 She noted that the Grutterplan
was not a rigid quota, 74 and rather than giving a fixed weight to membership in an
underrepresented racial group, the plan provided for "a highly individualized,
holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the
ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. 75 She
also contended that "like the Harvard plan Justice Powell referenced in Bakke, the
Law School's race-conscious admissions program adequately ensures that all
diversity are meaningfully considered
factors that may contribute to student body
76
decisions.,,
admissions
in
race
alongside
Justice O'Connor also asserted that, in order to pass constitutional muster,
"race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. 77 She found that
the Grutterplan passed this test because "[w]e take the Law School at its word
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 330.
Id.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id. at 333 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)).
Id. at 334.
Id. at 334-35.
Id. at 335-36.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 342.
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that it would 'like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula'
and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as
practicable." 7 8 She observed that "[i]t has been 25 years since Justice Powell first
approved the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the
context of public higher education" and opined that "[w]e expect that 25 years
from now, the use of racial79preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today."
Justice O'Connor's generous treatment of the law school affirmative action
program in Grutter stands in marked contrast to her harsh assessment of the
undergraduate program in Gratz.80 She found the award of a predetermined
numerical credit for being a URM to be constitutionally unacceptable. 81 Noting
that credit for other diversity-related factors was limited to a maximum credit of
five points--one quarter of the amount awarded to each URM-she complained
that "the selection index, by setting up automatic, predetermined point allocations
for the soft variables, ensures that the diversity contributions of applicants cannot
be individually assessed., 82 Thus, in her view, the undergraduate affirmative
action program failed the requirement that it be narrowly tailored to serve the
compelling governmental interest in achieving diversity.
V. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S APPROACH: AN ASSESSMENT

Justice O'Connor's treatment of the issues presented by the University 8of3
Michigan affirmative action plans is unsatisfying on a variety of different levels.
From a purely doctrinal perspective, her reasoning is often simply muddled. For
example, she purports to subject the Law School plan to strict scrutiny8 4 _a
standard of review whose hallmark is the idea that the government bears the
burden of demonstrating the need for its policy. Yet, almost in the next breath,
Justice O'Connor declares that "[t]he Law School's educationaljudgment that
[racial] diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we
defer"85 -a posture that, despite her protestations to the contrary, is inconsistent
with the very idea of strict scrutiny.
Similarly, one of the most striking features of the Grutter opinion is its
apparent failure to distinguish between different potential justifications for the
pursuit of diversity. Justice O'Connor's basic thesis is that the Law School could
78.

Id. at 343.

79. Id.
80.

81.
82.

See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276-77, 279-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
at 279-80.
Id. at 279.

83. For other similar criticisms of Justice O'Connor's approach, see, for example, Cass R.
Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1901-02 (2006), and Peter H. Schuck,
Reflections on Grutter 1-2 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Res. Paper
No. 61, 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=430606.
84. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
85. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
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rely on its compelling interest in enrolling a "critical mass" of minority race
students in order to gain the "educational benefits that diversity is likely to
produce" by creating a "classroom discussion [that] is livelier, more spirited, and
simply more enlightening and interesting." 86 In this passage, like Justice Powell
before her, Justice O'Connor appealed to the importance of the inputs that URMs
brought to the law school-the idea that their presence improves the quality of the
educational experience for all students at the law school.
At the same time, however, she sought to support the claim of educational
benefits by reference to outputs-the simple fact that, by its nature, affirmative
action programs at institutions such as the University of Michigan Law School
would provide URMs with credentials that would in turn be useful in helping
them obtain prestigious positions after they graduated. In so doing, she relied on
theories that had either explicitly or implicitly been rejected in prior case law.
For example she invoked an amicus brief that declared "'a highly-qualified,
racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its

principle mission to provide national security,"' 87 although Justice Powell had
concluded in Bakke that increasing the representation of URMs in the profession
did not constitute a compelling governmental interest. 88 In addition, when she
declared that "universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training
ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders," 89 and "[i]n order to cultivate a
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the
path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity," 90 Justice O'Connor came perilously close to endorsing the
"role model" theory that both the majority opinion and she herself had denigrated
in Wygant. 91 Yet Justice O'Connor showed no indication that she appreciated the
tensions between her arguments and those of the earlier affirmative action cases.
Justice O'Connor's characterization of the Law School plan also obfuscated the
true nature of the issues presented by Grutter. Taking great pains to distinguish
the plan from an impermissible quota, she claimed that the plan passed
constitutional muster because it did not "put [URMs] on separate admissions
tracks. 92 Anyone who has had even a passing association with the admissions
process at a college or university knows that this assertion beggars reality. 93 To
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at331.
See Regents ofthe Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,305-07 (1978) (opinion ofPowell,

J.).
89. Grutter,539 U.S. at 332.
90. Id.
91. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986); id. at 288 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
92. Grutter,539 U.S. at 334.
93. See, e.g., Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda, Diversity, Opportunity, andthe Shifting Meritocracy
in HigherEducation,72 AM. Soc. REV. 487, 487-88 (2007) ("To achieve [student diversification],
... selective institutions gave qualified minority applications an edge in admission.... [This] is an
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be sure, in the wake of the decision in Bakke, a university administrator would
have had to be either foolish or reckless to formally declare that only URMs could
be admitted under programs or criteria designed to ensure "diversity." Moreover,
the actual admission of a sprinkling of nonminority students through a diversity
program provides additional legal camouflage. But everyone involved in the
process knows that the applications of URMs are judged by an entirely different,
more lenient, set of criteria than those applied to other aspirants for admission.94
In Grutter itself, the statistical evidence on this point could hardly have been
clearer. An expert for the Law School testified that, if only students' grades and
LSAT scores were considered, only ten-percent of URM applicants per year
would have been admitted to the Law School. 95 Yet in each of the years between
1995 and 2000, no less than twenty-five percent of URM applicants were
admitted. 96
Moreover, the percentage of students admitted from each
underrepresented group correlated closely with the percentage of non-URMs
admitted in each year.97 Against this background, Justice O'Connor's
characterization of the University of Michigan Law School program can only be
ascribed to extraordinary naivet6, willful blindness, or simple disingenuousness.
The difficulties in Justice O'Connor's overall analysis of affirmative action
issues become even more apparent when her analysis in Grutter is juxtaposed
with her opinion in Gratz. She never explained why the Court should defer to the
university administrators on the importance of diversity to the educational
process, but not defer to their perception of the most appropriate means for
generating that diversity.
Indeed, one might easily conclude that the
presumptions should be reversed, because university administrators have great
experience with the admissions process and are in a particularly good position to
judge the likely impact of different affirmative action programs on the dynamic of
that process.
The University of Michigan approach to the integration of diversity, the more
general undergraduate admissions process, exemplifies this point. On its face, the
plan that was challenged in Gratz was a perfectly logical effort to assimilate the
treatment of URMs into that process. Like that of all selective state flagship
universities, the procedure of selecting the undergraduate class at the University
of Michigan was almost entirely numbers driven. 98 Thus, the University
generally offered admission to the students with the strongest GPA and
standardized test scores in the pool of in-state applicants, as well as the students
inevitable consequence of admission officers' growing reliance on test scores[, g]iven the lower
average test scores of minority students ....
").
94. See id.; see also Shikha Dalmia, Legacies ofInjustice, REASON, Feb. 2008, at 33-34
("Nearly every selective college, public and private, gives a sizeable edge to underrepresented
minorities.").
95. Grutter,539 U.S. at 320.
96. See id.
at 384, tbls.
1, 2, & 3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
97. See id.
98. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253-55 (2003).
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with the strongest GPA and standardized test scores in the pool of applicants from
other states. 99 The difficulty was that, in the absence of some adjustment, this
have resulted in the vast majority of URMs being denied
process would
100
admission.
The University's solution was to determine the minimum level of qualifications
that it deemed acceptable for URMs and to give a numerical plus factor, which in
effect placed these URMs on par with the strongest non-URM applicants-those
applicants to whom the University would normally offer admission. 10 1 This
approach had the advantage of achieving the University's diversity goals with
minimum disruption to the admissions process for all other students. Although
the absolute number of non-URMs offered admission was reduced, the process by
which the University compared non-URM applicants against one another
remained intact.
Justice O'Connor, however, was having none of it. She asserted that, in order
to be constitutional, race could only be considered in the context of a plan that
provided "nuanced judgments with respect to the contributions each applicant is
likely to make to the diversity of the incoming class."'10 2 Once again, she seemed
oblivious to the practical implications of this suggestion. Even if those who were
clearly accepted or rejected based on their grades and standardized test scores
were excluded, Justice O'Connor's proposal on its face would entail an in-depth
examination of the details of literally thousands of applications per year. Such an
examination would require a massive commitment of resources, with no promise
of a concomitant increase in the quality of the student body, however quality
might be measured. In short, the real world effects of the approach adopted by
Justice O'Connor in Grutter and Gratz are almost perverse. On one hand, she
condemned the use of the simplest and most efficient method for increasing the
access of URMs to higher education, and on the other provided incentives for
university administrators to be disingenuous in describing the manner in which
the admissions process actually functions.
The key to understanding Justice O'Connor's decision to adopt this
dysfunctional approach may lie in the final paragraphs of her opinion in Grutter.
There, as already noted, she declared that "race-conscious admissions policies
must be limited in time," 10 3 and
[i]t has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race
to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public
higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants
with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id.
See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274.
Id. at 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
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25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.' 04
She may have believed that, in political terms, the type of program that was at
issue in Gratz might have been more difficult to dislodge than the more
amorphous Grutter plan once the achievement gaps between the races had been
closed.
The problem is that history tells us that Justice O'Connor's twenty-five year
prediction was almost preposterously optimistic. She seemed to ascribe to a
vision of race relations in America somewhat akin to the romantic liberal view
that dominated "enlightened" political thought in the period between the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education0 5 in 1954 and the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by Congress a decade later.10 6 Many believed at that
time that the problem was the existence of explicit discrimination against African
Americans, and that if such discrimination could be eliminated we would all soon
be living in an equal-opportunity utopia.
Of course, we were all soon disabused of that notion. Justice O'Connor is no
doubt correct that, at least at the margins, some progress has been made in closing
10 7
the achievement gap between URMs and other members of the society.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that five decades after Brown, four decades after the
passage of the Civil Rights Act, and almost three decades after Bakke, no more
than ten percent of the URMs applying to the University of Michigan Law School
would have been offered admission in the absence of some consideration of race
in the admissions process.1 08 Moreover, the gap between whites and African
Americans in standardized test performance shows no sign of significantly
narrowing, and, in some cases, is even widening. 109 In short, the twenty-five year
timeline had no basis in reality.
VI. CONCLUSION

Shortly after Grutter and Gratz were decided, one New York Times
commentator praised Justice O'Connor for finding "the sweet spot where the
American political consensus abides.""1 0 If this in fact was her goal, her approach
104. Id. at 343 (citation omitted).
105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
106. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of42 U.S.C.).
107. Doug Lederman, Closing the College Achievement Gap, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 31,
2007, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/10/31/system.
108. Gruiter,539 U.S. at 320.
109. See The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, A LargeBlack- White Scoring Gap Persists
on the SAT, http://www.jbhe.com/features/53_SAT.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2008); The Journal of
Blacks in Higher Education, The Widening Racial Scoring Gap on StandardizedTestsfor Admission
to Graduate School, http://www.jbhe.com/news-views/51_graduate-admissionstest.html (last
visited Aug. 25, 2008).
110. Bill Keller, Op-Ed., Mr. Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2003, at A 15.
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rested on a fundamental misconception of the role of constitutional adjudication
in dealing with the issue of affirmative action. The Justices have no expertise in
designing affirmative action programs. Moreover, the Court is not well placed as
an institution to micromanage the myriad programs at public colleges and
universities throughout the country that have been designed by the admissions
officials who do have such expertise.
To be sure, if the admissions officers are pursuing a policy objective that is
outlawed by the Constitution, the Court has an obligation to intervene. But
Justice O'Connor quite explicitly concluded that the objective of increasing
minority enrollment was not inconsistent with constitutional norms. In such a
situation, the Justices at the very least are under an obligation to provide clear
guidance to those who will allow admissions officials to perform their function
candidly and in good faith, and that will reduce the transaction costs associated
with potential litigation.
Measured against this yardstick, the approach adopted by Justice O'ConnorBy
like that of Justice Powell before her-is a miserable failure.
constitutionalizing a Platonic ideal of a "fair" admissions process, Justice
O'Connor forces admissions officials to distort the real world process and to hide
what they are actually doing by parroting a fictional script that has been prepared
for them by the Court. Moreover, her formulation of the appropriate test only
encourages continuing litigation over the constitutionality of affirmative action
programs. In short, once having concluded that the Constitution allows the state
educational authorities to consider race in the context of a bona fide affirmative
action program, Justice O'Connor should have simply stayed her hand and
allowed admissions officials to do their jobs.

